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Article 8

CIVIL PROCEDURE:

RULE 16, A TOOL FOR JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OR JUDICIAL ACTIVISM?-G. Heileman Brewing Co. v.

Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1932, the federal judiciary has struggled to establish a uniform interpretation of procedural standards. Before the amendments to the federal civil rules in 1983, the courts attempted to adapt the somewhat
out-dated rules to modern problems.' Among the problems the original
rules failed, to address was management of the judicial docket.' Courts
were forced to utilize their inherent powe" to dispose of docket-clogging
cases because the Rules provided no such guidelines.' In 1983 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended." The amendments, especially those concerning Rule 16, were formulated to assist the courts in
the management of their caseloads and the more ready disposition of
5
cases.

This note will briefly examine the courts' efforts to manage their
dockets prior to the amendment of Rule 16 in 1983 in order to illustrate the need for the changes. This note also examines and analyzes
the application of amended Rule 16(a)(5) in light of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph
Oat Corporation,6 to demonstrate that the court of appeals exceeded
the intended meaning of the Rule by using it as a vehicle for forcing
represented parties to engage in the expense of accompanying their
1. Hellerstein, The New and Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1984 PRACTICING
LAW INST. 55.
2. Pollack, Cutting the Fat From Pretrial Proceedings, 97 F.R.D. 319 (1982). The original

Rule 16 was effective when promulgated in 1938, but was becoming useless in modern litigation.
It resulted in "mini-trials" which became nothing more than the exchange of legal ideology about
the case. Because attorneys often sent assistants who lacked the authority to reach an agreement,
the procedures recommended in the original Rule became "ceremonial and ritualistic." Id. at 321.
3.

Comment, Judicial Authority in the Settlement of Federal Civil Cases, 42 WASH. & LEE

L. REV. 171 (1985). These inherent powers are derived from the very nature of the judicial system
and ensure that judges have the authority to resolve the disputes before them as justice requires.
Id. at 179. These inherent powers provide authority for judicial intervention in facilitating settlement. Id. at 180.
4.

Excerpt from the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice

and Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 189 (1982).
5. Id. The proposals were "designed to reduce discovery abuse and the abuse of process, to
reform the procedures for the conduct of pretrial conferences and for the scheduling and management of litigation by district judges .
I..."
Id. In addition to Rule 16, the Advisory Committee
also proposed amendments to Rules 6, 7, 11, 26, 52, 53, 67, and 72-76. Id. at 190.
6. 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989).
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counsel to pretrial settlement conferences. The note also discusses the
ineffective use of Rule 16 as a means of judicial management. Finally,
this note focuses on the imposition of sanctions as a means of imple-

menting the Rule's management role.
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

In 1980, Joseph Oat Corporation supplied a waste water pretreatment system for a waste water treatment plant built for G. Heileman
7
Brewing Company by RME Associates. The treatment plant began to
malfunction causing disputes between G. Heileman Brewing, Oat, and

RME Associates.' In December of 1982, Oat sued Heileman and RME

in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, and

RME counterclaimed. 9 The suit was then transferred to the United

10
States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. A Federal magistrate ordered Joseph -Oat Corporation to send a corporate
"representative having full authority to settle the case"" to a pretrial

conference. The purpose of the conference was to resolve factual and

2
legal issues involved in the suit, and to induce settlement. Oat was
represented at the conference by its attorney of record and another at18
torney who was authorized to speak on behalf of the corporation, but
'
did not send a corporate principle to the conference." The district
court determined that this failure to send a corporate representative
5
was a violation of the court's order.1 The district court, pursuant to

7. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 107 F.R.D. 275, 277 (W.D. Wis. 1985),
rev'd, 848 F.2d 1415 (7th Cir. 1988), affd en banc, 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. When the suit was transferred to the Western District of Wisconsin, RME joined
third party defendant Centrale Suiker Maatschappij (CSM), owner and licensor of the pretreatment system. Heileman also instituted an action in the circuit court of Waukesha County against
Joseph Oat and RME. RME crossclaimed against Joseph Oat, counterclaimed against Heileman,
and joined CSM. Early in the litigation, Joseph Oat and Heileman withdrew all claims between
them. Joseph Oat later dismissed it's complaint against RME. Id. Prior to the motion giving rise
to the instant case, Heileman, RME, and CSM resolved their differences. Heileman was granted
leave to intervene in this case and to be substituted for RME in RME's claims against Joseph
Oat. Id. at n.l.
11. Id. at 278.
12. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 650 (7th Cir. 1989).
13. John Possi, Oat's attorney of record in the action and Joseph McMahon, an independent
adjuster appearing for Oat's liability insurer, attended this settlement conference. Both informed
the magistrate that they had no authority to agree to pay money, but had the authority to settle
the case if Oat or National Union Fire Insurance Company did not have to pay. G. Heileman
Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 848 F.2d 1415, 1417 (7th Cir. 1988), aff'd en banc, 871 F.2d
648 (7th Cir. 1989).
14. Id.
15. 871 F.2d at 650. The magistrate's order required the presence of a "corporate representative with full authority to settle." Id. at 653.
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Rule 16(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 6 imposed sanctions
upon Joseph Oat Corporation in the amount of $5860.01, ' which represented the court costs and attorneys fees for the opposing parties who
sent corporate representatives to the pretrial conference in compliance
with the court's order.' 8
Rule 16 provides that the court may require the attendance of "attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties."' 9 According to
the plain language of the Rule, it is questionable whether a litigant
may be required to accompany his attorney to a pretrial conference. As
a result of the imposition of sanctions for its violation, Oat appealed,
claiming that the district court .abused its discretion when it required
the attendance of litigants in addition to their counsel.2 Oat argued, by
way of negative implication,, that Rule 16(a)(5) prohibits courts from
mandating that litigants attend a, pretrial conference when they are
represented by an attorney." The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit originally agreed with Oat's argument and reversed the district
court decision. 2 On rehearing en banc, however, the court of appeals
held that the primary objective behind Rule 16 is -to "urge judges to
make wider use of their powers and to manage actively their dockets
from an early stage." 2 8 This inherent authority enables courts to order
represented parties to appear at pretrial conferences if such action
would assist in docket management." The court of appeals reasoned
that since Oat raised- no objections to the obligation set forth in the

16.

FED. R. Civ. P. 16 provides:
(f) Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial
order, or if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, or if a party or party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the
conference, or if a party or party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, the judge,
-upon motion or the judge's own initiative, may make such-orders with regard thereto as are
just, and among others any of the orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D).
17. 871 F.2d at 650.
18. Id.
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 provides:
(a) Pretrial Conferences; Objectives. In any action the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a

conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as
(1) expediting the disposition of the action;
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not be protracted
because of lack of management;
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities;
(4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough preparation, and;
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case.
20. 871 F.2d at 650.
21.

Id.

22. 848 F.2d at 1415.
23. 871 F.2d at 652:
24. Id.at 651.
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pretrial order, it should have anticipated that it would be required to
25
fully comply with the order. Thus, the court of appeals held that
there was no abuse of authority or discretion by the magistrate in compelling the attendance of an Oat corporate representative who had the
26
authority to settle the case. The court further held that the imposition
of
of sanctions was not an abuse of discretion because Oat was aware
2
the court's expectations of compliance with the pretrial order . The
8
judgment of the district court was, therefore, affirmed.
III.

BACKGROUND

Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated
in 1938, Rule 16 was not revised until 1983.29 Under the pre-amendment rule, 30 district courts had the discretion to request attorneys for
the parties to attend pretrial conferences. Cases could be dismissed for
failure to prosecute which occurred, for example, when a party's attorney failed to appear at a pretrial conference or disobeyed a pretrial
order.3 1 Whatever the reason, failure to prosecute often resulted in the
involuntary dismissal of the case. The power to dismiss was derived
from Rule 41(b) or the court's inherent power to control their

Id. at 654.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 649.
FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note.
The pre-1983 Rule 16 stated:
In any action, the court may in it's discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to
appear before it for a conference to consider:
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid
unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for findings to be
used- as evidence when the trial is to be by jury;
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, the
amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to any of
the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of by
admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered controls the subsequent
course of the action unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. The court in
its discretion may establish by rule a pretrial calendar on which actions may be placed for
consideration as above provided and may either confine the calendar to jury actions or to
non-jury actions to extend it to all actions.
Id.; see also Murrah, Pretrial Procedure. A Statement of Its Essentials, 14 F.R.D. 417-18 (1954)
(a statement concerning the use of the former Rule 16).
31. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962) (Authority to dismiss for lack of prosecution is part of the courts' inherent power-the control vested in the courts to manage their
caseload).
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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caseload. 2
Prior to the amendment of the rules in 1983, courts utilized their
inherent authority to dispose of stagnant cases. In 1962, the United
States Supreme Court was confronted with the legitimacy of the use of
this inherent power to dispose of a case in Link v. Wabash Railroad
Co. 3 In Link, a diversity action was brought arising from a collision
between Link's automobile and one of Wabash Railroad's trains.'
More than six years after the collision and after two fixed trial dates
had been postponed, the District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana notified counsel for both parties that their attendance was required at a pretrial conference.3 5 Counsel for Link failed to attend the
conference. 6 The district court dismissed the case, sua sponte, because
Link's counsel had not given a reasonable excuse for his absence." The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissal. 8
In Link, the United States Supreme Court held that there was no
abuse of discretion in dismissing the action in light of the entire factual
circumstances of the case." The Supreme Court noted that the trial
court had waited an additional two hours after the scheduled time of
the conference before it dismissed the case." ° The Supreme Court
stated that this dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute was not
only unquestionable, it was necessary."' The petitioner in Link contended that the trial court could only dismiss the action for failure to
prosecute upon motion from the defendant. Thus, because no such motion was made, the negative implication of FED. R. Civ. P. 4142 prohib32.

FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides:
(b) Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of the
court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against the defendant. . . . Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under
this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
"Behind the face of Rule 16, a narrowly circumscribed area of power has developed which the
judge may employ to compel obedience to his requests and demands relating to the pre-trial conference." J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318, 1323
(7th Cir. 1976).
33. 370 U.S. 626.
34. Id. at 627.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 628. Link's counsel was in Indianapolis filing documents concerning another case.
37. Id. at 628-29.
38. Id. at 629, 636.
39. Id. at 635.
40. Id. at 629.
41. Id at 635z
42. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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ited the trial court's dismissal.4 s The Supreme Court stated that the
rule did not warrant such an interpretation and that it was not intended
to divest the courts of the power to clear their dockets of stagnant cases
4
left unattended through the inaction of the parties. The Court also
noted that the poor telephone excuse offered by Link's counsel as well
as the expansive history of the litigation indicated that Link's counsel
45
had been acting in a dilatory fashion. The Court stated that the holding "amounts to no broader a holding than that the failure to appear at
a pretrial conference may, in the context of other evidence of delay, be
considered by a District Court as justifying a dismissal with prejudice." 46
In In re LaMarre,' decided just prior to the amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
followed the Supreme Court precedent set in Link. LaMarre was the
claims manager for Insurance Company of North America which in48
sured Travelodge International, one of the original parties to the suit.
As the case approached trial, counsel for the plaintiffs and defendants
were willing to settle, but LaMarre would not accept the recommenda49
tion of counsel concerning the settlement figure. LaMarre refused to
50
attend four scheduled settlement conferences. Finally, the court or51
dered the marshal to compel LaMarre's attendance. He was found in
52
contempt of court and fined one hundred dollars. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals noted that although ordering a party to attend a pretrial conference presented a question of first impression, pretrial ,pro53
ceedings are an "integral and vital part of the judicial process." The

43. 370 U.S. at 630.
44. Id. at 630-31.
45. Id. at 633.
46. Id.
The power is of ancient origin, having its roots in judgment of nonsuit and non prosequitur
entered at common law and dismissals for want of prosecution of bills in equity.
The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been
considered an "inherent power," governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.
Id. at 630-31 (citations omitted).
47. In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1974).
48. Id. at 754. LaMarre had principal control over the defense for INA and Travelodge. Id.
at 756.
'49. Id. at 755. Since counsel for INA and personal counsel for one of the defendants still
held the settlement acceptable, the court requested LaMarre's presence at a conference. Id.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
id.
Id. at 754-55.
Id. at 756.
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court of appeals found no logical reason for denying a trial judge's authority to compel the attendance of a party at any session of the court
where the judge finds that the party's presence is necessary. 54 The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that LaMarre could not refuse a
lawful order to attend a settlement conference.15
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a similar issue in
Strandell v. Jackson County." The Strandells, whose son had been arrested, strip searched, imprisoned and had later committed suicide,
sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 5 7 The plaintiffs filed with the
district court a written report concerning settlement efforts. 8 The district court suggested a summary jury trial 9 as an alternative method of
disposing of the case because its docket was heavily burdened.6 0 The
objective of a summary jury trial is to induce settlement.6 1 The
Strandells' attorney refused to participate in the summary jury trial
and was held in criminal contempt. 62 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the contempt judgment reasoning that Rule 16 was not
intended to coerce an unwilling litigant into a deviation from the normal course of- litigation.63

54. Id. The courtcorrectly determined that LaMarre was a party to the suit because he was
the INA agent in charge of the case. Id.
55. The court stated:
Pretrial proceedings, whether for preparation for trial or for settlement conferences,
are an integral and vital part of the judicial process. Rules of court guide and control
pretrial. We perceive no grounds for denying the trial judge the power to require attendance of any party to the case at any session of the court where the judge deems his presence necessary.
Id. (citations omitted).
56. 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988).
57. Strandell v. Jackson County, 634 F. Supp. 824, 826-27 (S.D. Ill. 1986), vacated, 830
F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987) (Attorney appealed the district court's order holding him in contempt
for refusing to participate in a summary jury trial.).
58. 838 F.2d at 884.
59. A summary jury trial is a method of alternative dispute resolution. It involves six jurors
who hear approximations by counsel of the evidence they expect to present at trial. Anticipated
testimony is summarized by the attorneys and no witnesses are presented. The jury then reaches
an advisory, non-binding verdict. The summary jury verdict has no legal impact on the actual
verdict. The objective of the summary jury trial is to promote settlement. Lambros, The Summary
Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461, 468-72 (1984)
(Judge Lambros prepared this report for the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of
the Jury System). The summary jury trial is useful in a variety of cases: simple personal injury
actions, commercial contracts, products liability, discrimination, defamation and anti-trust. This
method of encouraging settlement should be reserved for cases that are unlikely to settle if left to
attorneys. Id. at 471-72; see also, D. PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT
JUDGES 68 (Federal Judicial Center 1986).
60. 838 F.2d at 884.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 885.
63. Id. at 887-88.
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In 1983, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended. Rule
16 was amended to meet the expanding challenges of modern litigation." The revisions were also designed to reduce the delay and expense
of litigation pursuant to Rule 1."

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Judicial Interpretation of Rule 16(a)(5)

60
In G. Heileman Brewery Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit interpreted Rule 16 as a license to
utilize alternative methods of dispute resolution, specifically pretrial
settlement conferences.7 The court's majority opinion rejected the notion that Rule 16 prohibits courts from demanding the presence of rep68
resented parties at pretrial settlement conferences. The majority in
Heileman reasoned that Rule 16 is not intended to limit judicial au9
thority when conducting pretrial conferences. Instead, the court found
that Rule 16 is to be interpreted as expanding the inherent authority of
70
district court judges in controlling litigation. This authority permits
the judges to exert more effective control over their dockets to ensure
the efficiency of the judicial system as prescribed by Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1
The decision in Heileman includes five strong dissenting opinions
which more clearly interpret the meaning and purpose of Rule 16. The
purpose of Rule 16 is most concisely stated by Judge Clark. Coincidently, Judge Clark was the primary draftsman of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, particularly Rule 16, giving him particular insight as
to the drafters' intent in framing the Rule. Judge Clark maintains that
the objective of Rule 16(a)(5) is not to coerce parties into submission
72
to settlement agreements through judicial intervention. Rather, Judge

FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 which provides:
These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a
civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81. They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.
66. 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989).
67. Id. at 652.
68. Id. at 652.
69. Id.
70. Id. "We therefore conclude that our interpretation of Rule 16 to allow district courts to
order represented parties to appear at pretrial settlement conferences merely represents another
application of a district judge's inherent authority to preserve the efficiency, and more importantly
the integrity, of the judicial process." Id.
71. See supra note 65.
72. Flanders, Case Management in Federal Courts: Some Controversies and Some Results,
4 JUST. SYS. J. .147, 156 (1976); see also Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985) (The
64.
65.
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Clark stated that "[p]retrial, in purpose and in its most successful use,
is informational and factual, rather than legal and coercive."1 73 Contrary to Judge Clark's reliance on the drafters' intent, Judge Posner, in
his dissent in Heileman, chose to rely on the plain language of Rule
61. Posner argued that nothing in Rule 16, nor in any other rule or
statute, confers upon a district court the power to summon a represented party to a settlement conference. 5 Judge Posner argued that
since Oat hired an attorney to resolve the dispute, the corporation had
indicated that it did not want to burden its executives with the suit, and
pursuant to the plain language of the Rule such action was not
required. 6
Judge Coffey also dissented in Heileman and agreed with Posner
that the Rule does not grant district courts the power to require a represented party to appear at a pretrial conference with his attorney.7
He reasoned that there must be a balance between the need for judicial
efficiency and the rights of individual litigants.7 8 This balancing was
addressed by Congress and the Supreme Court when the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1932 and amended in 1983.7 9 Coffey stated: "[t]he obvious intent of the Supreme Court and Congress
that only attorneys and unrepresented parties be required to participate
in pretrial conferences is clearly supported by the specific references to
'attorneys' and 'unrepresented parties' throughout Rule 16."'80 The
majority's interpretation is in direct conflict with the plain language of the
Rule. Judge Coffey concluded that, in order for Rule 16 to grant federal trial judges the authority to require parties to accompany their
attorneys to pretrial conferences, the Rule must be so interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court or amended by Congress. The expansion of the Rule's boundaries, as encouraged by the majority, is properly done only through the amendment process, not by a decision of the

imposition of sanctions upon a physician's attorney for deciding to settle after one day of trial
when he did not settle during a pretrial conference was an abuse of the power given by Federal
Civil Procedure Rule 16(f).).
73. Flanders, supra note 72, at 156 (quoting C. CLARK, To AN UNDERSTANDING USE OF
PRETRIAL PROCEDURE-THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE 155-56 (1965)).
74. 871 F.2d at 657 (Posner, J.,dissenting).
75. Id. ("The main purpose of the pretrial conference is to get ready for trial. For that
purpose, only the attorneys need be present, unless a party is acting as his own attorney.").
76. Id.
77. Id. at 658 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 662-63.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 660. Rule 16(b) makes a distinction between attorneys for the parties and any
unrepresented parties. Rule 16(d) requires attendance at the final pretrial conference by "at least
one of the attorneys who will conduct the trial for each of the parties and by any unrepresented
parties." FED. R. Civ. P. 16(d).
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1
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Judge Easterbrook, in his dissent, divided the Heileman case into
three issues: the lack of authority of the district court to demand the
presence of someone at the conference other than the party's attorney;
the lack of authority of the district court to demand that this person be
an employee of the company rather than a representative appointed for
this conference; and the propriety of the magistrate's requirement that
82
this representative have full settlement authority. Judge Easterbrook
stated that even if one accepts the majority's position that the district
court has the authority to require a corporate representative to accompany an attorney to the conference, it does not follow that the district
83
courts-have power over the other two issues. Oat sent an attorney to
8
handle settlement negotiations. This allowed a skilled representative
to consider the possibility of settlement without depriving the corporation of its management personnel. However, the requirement of full settlement authority was imposed so the case might be settled on the spot.
Thus, since Oat's representative had only the limited authority to discuss and recommend settlement options, the majority concluded that
8
his presence did not comply with the order. '
Judge Ripple also wrote a separate dissent in Heileman. He argued that the gravest consequence of the majority's holding was the
the
negative impact upon the relationship between the Judiciary and
8 Alcourts.
federal
the
for
Congress in establishing rules of procedure
though a judge retains a certain amount of inherent authority to adapt
the rules to individual situations, this authority cannot be used in a
manner which is clearly contrary to the policies enumerated in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1
Also dissenting in Heileman was Judge Manion, who wrote the
88
original court of appeals decision reversing the sanction against Oat.
He reasoned that Rule 16 does not invite the use of the court's inherent
power8 9 because the use of inherent authority is reserved for filling gaps

81. 871 F.2d at 662-63 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 663 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
Jo84. Id. ("Corporations choose their agents and decide what powers to give them.
seph Oat Corp. sent to the conference not only its counsel of record but also John Fitzpatrick, who
had the authority to speak for Oat.").
85. Id. at 664.
86. Id. at 665 (Ripple, J., dissenting) ("Recognizing that the line between substance and
procedure is at best an indistinct and vague one, the two branches of government have established
a long tradition of shared responsibility for this aspect of governance.").
87. Id. ("[T]he Rules Enabling Act hardly contemplates the broad, amorphous, definition of
the 'inherent power of a district judge' articulated by the majority.").
88. Heileman, 848 F.2d 1415 (7th Cir. 1988), affid en banc, 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989).
89. 871 F.2d at 666 (Manion, J., dissenting) ("Inherent power is not a license for federal
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left in a particular statute or rule.90 "Rule 16 specifically addresses the
use of settlement conferences""' and consistently distinguishes between
represented and unrepresented parties."2 Manion argued that the majority offered no explanation for its interpretation that Rule 16(a)(5)
was one which allowed district court judges to order represented parties
to appear at pretrial conferences. 98 Instead, the majority ignores the
fact that had the drafters of the amendments intended to include represented parties among those whom the court could require to attend
conferences, they would have expressly stated so in the Rule. 4 In order
to discredit the argument that the exclusion .of represented parties in
the amendment was inadvertent, Judge Manion explores the thorough
process by which the Civil Rules are amended.98 First, a draft of the
proposed amendments is sent to thousands in the legal community. The
Advisory Committee then receives comments on the proposals and reevaluates the draft. Once the committee is satisfied with the draft, it
must be approved by the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure. It must then be approved by the Judicial Conference of the
United States, and finally by the United States Supreme Court. Even
after the proposed amendments have successfully passed through these
channels, Congress may still reject the amendments.9 6 In light of this
stringent approval process it is difficult to believe that the language of
Rule 16 does not express exactly what the Advisory Committee
intended.
B. Rule 16-an ineffective means of controllingcaseloads
Since the majority and dissenting opinions in Heileman are each
courts to do whatever seems necessary to move a case along.,,).
90. Id. "Inherent power is simply 'another name for the power of courts to make
common
law when statutes and rules do not address a particular area.' " Id. (citations omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 667. "Rule 16(a) ... provides that a district court may 'direct the attorneys
for
the parties and any unrepresented parties' to appear for a pretrial conference. Rule
16(a) thus
defines who the 'participants' at a pretrial conference are: attorneys and unrepresented
parties."
Id. (emphasis omitted).
93. Id. at 668.
Rule 16 is dead set against any coercive settlement practices. . . .Even if it is possible
to
draw a distinction between "discussing" and "negotiating" that is reasonably possible
to
enforce, the kind of coerced participation by represented parties in settlement conferences
that the majority seems to approve is close enough to forced negotiation to fall within
the
advisory committee's general admonition against forced settlement.
Id. at 669 (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 668.
95. Id.
96. Id. "'The process is calculated to ensure that any changes reflect the best thinking
of
the entire profession.'" Id. (quoting 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3152 (1973)). Id.
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strongly supported, it is only logical to weigh the benefits and disadvantages of mandatory attendance of represented parties at pretrial conferences in an effort to determine the proper application. There are several
benefits to the interpretation offered by the majority opinion .inHeileman. One benefit is the immediacy of result. If the parties can agree to
terms, the case is disposed of at once. Such a result promotes judicial
economy because it eliminates the time required for an attorney to contact his client, repeat the terms of the offer, and advise his client. Another benefit to this approach is that, theoretically, the parties would be
more content with the terms of the settlement because they would directly participate in each step of the settlement process.
On the other hand, there are substantial disadvantages involved in
inherent
mandating this type of client participation. First, construing
' '97 This could lead
high-handedness.
power loosely encourages "judicial
to coercive settlements. Second, it would defeat the purpose of hiring
an attorney. A client who retains counsel desires that the attorney contend with the other litigants as well as all the legalities involved in his
particular suit. If the client was required to accompany his attorney to
a pretrial settlement conference, he would incur the expense and inconvenience he was attempting to avoid by hiring an attorney in the first
place. Third, there is a negative impact on the appearance of the fair98
ness and neutrality of the court. A party who disagrees with the
fear he or
judge's recommendations during a pretrial conference may
9 Last, the psyshe will not receive a fair trial before the same judge.
chological impact of appearing before a judge is often overwhelming. A
party who is not knowledgeable in the intricacies of the law may be
intimidated by the legal language, the meeting in chambers, and the
judge's presence. If a party is not satisfied with the proposal received
from the opposition he may find it difficult to express dissatisfaction
before the opposing litigants, their counsel, and the judge. This, coupled with the strong likelihood that there will be minimal time during
which to confer with counsel, may make the parties feel pressured into
a settlement with which they are not satisfied.
After the court of appeals in Heileman determined that it was
dissenting
97. Id. at 670. To emphasize this, Judge Manion quotes from Judge Posner's
indeed
and
willful,
unreasonable,
"'arbitrary,
as
actions
opinion which labeled the magistrate's

petulant.'" Id.
98. id.
99. Judge Manion stated:
It is difficult to believe that a litigant who has been forced to appear against his will and
possibly to listen to the opposing party or judicial officer berate his litigation position, is
going to walk away from that experience feeling he will, get a fair shake from the court at
trial if he resists the pressure to capitulate.
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•within the district court's authority to require the presence of both represented and unrepresented parties at the pretrial settlement conference, it then determined that the court had not abused its power in
exercising this authority. 0 0 The court determined that Rule 16 is not
structured so as to compel unwilling parties to accept settlement proposals. However, Rule 16 does allow a court to require the presence of
one in a position with the "corporate entity allowing him to speak definitely and to commit the corporation to a particular position in the
litigation."'' 1 The court based its conclusion on the fact that the litigation between the two parties involved a claim for four million dollars
and many complex factual and legal issues. 0 2 Given the expansive nature of the controversy, it appeared that the litigation would have resulted in a trial lasting an estimated one to three months, thus occupying a great deal of judicial time.'
The presence of a corporate
representative at the conference may have resulted in settlement. The
court reasoned that in light of the circumstances it was less burdensome to have the corporation incur the expenses in attending the conference than to unnecessarily monopolize the court's time with a full
time adjudication. 4
Since Heileman established that Rule 16 does authorize federal
judges to compel parties to attend a pretrial settlement conference, one
must determine whether the use of the pretrial conference, a device
used to .facilitate settlement negotiations, actually assists the district
court judges in effective docket management.
A litigant is entitled to a fair trial, but not to a "blank check" for
the judge's time.0 5 The taxpayers expect effective judicial docket control to ensure against the abuse of the judicial system. 06 Thus, pretrial
conferences must produce both judicial economy and a just result for

100. Id. at 653-55.
101. Id. at 653.
102. Id. at 654.
103. Id.
104. Id. ("[B]ecause the stakes were high we do not believe that the burden of requiring a
corporate representative to attend a pretrial settlement conference was out of proportion to the
benefits to be gained, not only by the litigants but also the court.").
105. Rubin, The Managed Calendar: Some Pragmatic Suggestions About Achieving the
Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Civil Cases in Federal Courts, 4 JUST. SYS. J.
135, 136 (1978). The article discusses:
what the judge ought to do with respect to case management, .... whether he ought to do
nothing at all, and instead spend all of his time hearing cases in whatever state of preparation and at whatever time they eventually reach trial-and for however long counsel may
choose to take to complete the trial.
Id. at 137.
106. Id.
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the parties.1 07 A significant effect of the adjudicative process with re-

gard to fairness is that "adjudication is the process by. which our rules
are fleshed out in their principled and practical way, . . . settlement
may pose a problem."" 8
"Managerial judges" is the term used to describe judges who ac-

tively control their dockets.109 In addition to their traditional role as
trial adjudicator, these judges prioritize meeting with parties in chambers to discuss the possibility of settlement and supervise overall case
preparation. 1 0 The managerial judge relies on settlement-enhancing

techniques to curb the costs of litigation and to avoid stagnancy of the
docket."'

One of the most significant reasons for the amendments. of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to encompass this new judicial technique was the increase in the number of disputes which prompt litigation.11

According to the Administrative Office of the United States

Courts, only five percent of the civil cases adjudicated in federal dis-

trict courts during 1983-1984 actually reached trial.1 1 3 The percentage
of completed trials was significantly lower. 4 In light of this data, set107. Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory
Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 489 (1985). This article explores the virtues and
the problems with mandatory settlement conferences. Menkel-Meadows cautions critics and proponents of the mandatory settlement conference that how one evaluates its utility depends on
whether the comparison is between individual cases, numbers of cases on the docket, or the quality
of the results achieved. She warns that the evaluations are inconclusive and further studies must
be done. "Since settlement conferences are becoming mandatory, those who criticize settlement
should join efforts to understand, study, and deal with the problems presented by the process so
that the interests of justice they value will not be lost in the search for more efficient ways to
administer the litigation process." Id. at 514.
108. Id. at 501. Menkel-Meadow fears that so many cases may be diverted away from the
full trial system that we will not have enough left for rule making. Once these rules are made, we
may not have enough cases in the system by which to test their limits. Id.
109. Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARVARD L. REV. 374 (1982) (a discussion of the new
trend in active judicial participation in cases from filing to disposition, which enables these judges
to learn more about the cases before them and to play a critical role in the progression of cases
through the system). Contra Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 507-08 (1984) (One of the author's criticisms of Professor Resnik's article is that
it exaggerates the extent to which this new technique is inconsistent with due process. He believes
that she confuses questionable, rarely used approaches with established practices and fails to provide evidence that such approaches lead to undesirable results.).
110. Resnik, supra note 109, at 376-77.
111. PROVINE, supra note 59, at 18. (report compiled to discuss alternative techniques for
settlement available to judges. Information obtained from literature, interviews with leading judicial experts, and the results of a conference attended by 20 of these experts).
112. Id. at 7.
113. Id. (citing ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 284, table C4).
114. Id. The report also shows there are differences in the rate at which certain cases go to
trial. Some types of cases are more likely to be settled than others. For example, in 1983-84 more
than ten percent of most personal injury actions, civil rights employment disputes, and Fair Labor
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/8
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tlement appears to be a desirable result of pretrial conferences; preferable to an adjudicated result.11 5
C. Three ways in which judges may attempt to apply Rule 16 to
facilitate docket management
Judges have three ways in which to exercise their authority to promote settlement. " 6 First, he may chose to formulate an across-theboard policy of intervention.1 17 This policy would not differentiate between the types of cases with which the judge is faced." 8 An acrossthe-board policy would spur frivolous pretrial settlement conferences in
cases where neither side is willing to offer resolutions or make concessions. Since the goal of the pretrial settlement conference is to lessen
the demand on judicial time, this approach is contrary to that goal. Not
distinguishing between the types of cases will result in lengthy, often
unsuccessful conferences in every case with which a judge is involved.
Second, the judge may choose not to intervene until one party requests judicial intervention." If a lawyer thinks his client's case is
weak, he will usually initiate settlement negotiations without judicial
intervention. This policy fails where there is a case in which both sides
have strong points yet they may be willing to consider settlement in
order to avoid costly litigation. Neither may be willing to initiate settlement negotiations because if one party requests a pretrial settlement
conference the other will perceive it as an admission of weakness. 2 °
Therefore, even when judicial intervention may be appropriate, the
judge who adopts this policy may never receive a request for a settlement conference.
" '
Last, the judge may intervene selectively.12
Using this approach,
the judge will only ignore cases which have the potential to settle without assistance, as well as those that will require little resources if taken
to trial.12 2 This application of judicial intervention is clearly the best.
Standards Act cases reached trial. Comparatively, less than two percent of prisoner petitions,
Social Security Act cases, and real property litigation went to trial. Id. at 11.
115. Flanders, supra note 72, at 148 (this belief has become a universal basis upon which
federal .judges build their management techniques).
116. PROVINE, supra note 59, at 10.
117. Id. Judges who favor an across-the-board policy are usually interested in promoting
intervention in every case. Provine's report reveals that not one interviewed would refuse to become involved in all cases with which he is confronted. Id. at 11.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (it is an advantage to be the party who does not request, but has the opportunity to
respond to a call for judicial intervention in the settlement of the case).
121. Id. at 12. (judges utilizing this approach feel unsolicited intervention is appropriate in
some but not all cases).
122. Id. at 12-13.
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Because the choice of intervention is left to the judge, the likelihood of
frivolous and time-consuming pretrial conferences is minimized. The
judge has the ability to determine the probability of a successful conference and intervene without having to wait until his participation is
requested.
Those who support the use of the settlement conference emphasize
its ability to dispose of cases efficiently.""3 The process, they claim,
reduces the delay of resolution and increases the probability of achieving settlement. 12 4 A settlement conference has two important functions:
"[i]t can help break down the psychological and strategic barriers that
lie in the path of settlement negotiations; and . . . the conference can
provide the additional information the litigants need to settle the
case." 2 5 Settlement through conferences alleviates the unmitigated
win-lose outcome of the trial. It affords the parties an opportunity for
greater satisfaction with the results.
Utilizing managerial techniques also involves some detrimental
factors. For example, the judge's time is the most costly and scarce
resource in the judicial process.' 26 Instead' of using the time to try
cases, managerial judges must spend time meeting with parties to develop litigation plans. 27 "Managerial judges have more data sheets to
complete, more conferences on new management techniques to attend,
28
and ever more elaborate local procedural rules to draft and debate."'
Thus, there is little reason for one to believe that these techniques actually reduce litigant costs and promote judicial economy. There may
also be a substantial detriment to justice. While the motivation behind
implementing judicial management is the promotion of time-efficiency,
the quality of justice should not be sacrificed.
Additionally, the efficiency-minded judge who uses the settlement
conference to control his docket is more likely to use coercive techniques in encouraging settlement. 2" This illustrates the potential danger of promoting efficiency over substantive justice. Such a result
should be avoided because settlement is probably the closest thing to a
"truly final judgment that can emerge from litigation."'3 0 A settlement

123. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 107, at 493.
124. Id.
125. PROVINE, supra note 59, at 24 (most judges infer that psychological barriers are inhibiting settlement when the parties have failed to negotiate on their own).
126. Resnik, supra note 109, at 423-24.
127. Id. at 424.
128. Id. (even though some. of these tasks are delegated to staff, the judge must still supervise the administration of these duties).
129. Menkel-Meadow, Judges and Settlement: What Part Should Judges Play?, TRIAL,
Oct. 1985, at 27.
130. Resnik, supra note 109, at 513-14.
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is not normally appealable because it should be a result each party has
consciously chosen.
The risk of promoting efficiency over substantive justice requires
an inquiry into the success of using the pretrial settlement conference
as a method of docket management. There is little evidence available to
support the conclusion that docket management is responsible for judicial efficiency." 3 ' It is even more tenuous to conclude that pretrial set-.
tlement efforts have any effect on docket management.'3 2 Four studies
have been performed to determine the effect of the settlement conference on the number of case dispositions. 38 Only one study produced
any positive relationship between the number ofcase dispositions prior
to trial and the use of pretrial settlement conferences. It is important to
note that measuring the effect of pretrial settlement conferences is very
difficult because of the variables involved. For example, certain issues
may not be difficult to resolve. It is possible that the parties involved in
the cases studied were more open to compromise. Also, the different
research techniques used may have jaded the results. These inconclusive results merely indicate that "[m]ore studies will be necessary to
determine whether settlement can be effectively promoted through
judge-hosted settlement conferences, and under what conditions."' 34
D. The imposition of sanctions, although authorized by Rule 16Wf,
was improper in Heileman because the magistrate's order itself was
violative of Rule 16(a)(5)
The majority's interpretation of Rule 16 in Heileman has granted
131. Resnik, supra note 109, at 417. Although these techniques may prove effective at the
appellate level, there are too many components in the trial court-judges, attorneys, litigants,
witnesses, jurors-to formulate a strategy for management which will be successful in all cases.
Id. at 418.
132. Comment, Recent Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Prescriptions to
Ease the Pain?, 15 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 887, 906 (1984). The article discusses the three major
ways in which Rule 16 has been revised. First, the objectives of the pretrial conference have been
broadened, and the range of topics to be covered has been expanded. Id. at 893. Second, Rule
16(b) provides for the scheduling of a conference between attorneys, parties and the judge. Id. at
894. Lastly, Rule 16(f) provides sanctioning power to enable the courts to enforce their authority
to mandate these conferences. Id. at 895.
133. PROVINE, supra note 59, at 38. The earliest study was conducted in 1960-62 by Professor Maurice Rosenburg. This study of New Jersey personal injury cases revealed that mandatory
pretrial'conferences actually reduced the court's efficiency. Id. at 38 n.86. Studies conducted by
the Federal Judicial Center and the National Center for State Courts also yielded the same result:
judicial efforts to promote settlement in pretrial conferences did not increase the number of case
dispositions. Id. at 38-39 nn.86, 87. The fourth study has uncovered a positive relationship between pretrial conferences and settlement. The study was a comparison of 621 civil cases filed
with the Ontario Supreme Court. See Stevenson, Watson, & Weissman, The Impact of Pretrial
Conferences: An Interim Report on the Ontario Pretrial Conference Experiment, 15 OSGOODa
HALL L.J. 591 (1977).
134.byPROVINE,
supra1989
note 59, at 40.
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judges a new type of power.13 5 A judge, at least in the Seventh Circuit,

has the power to dictate who will be present at the pretrial conference.1"6 The power to sanction parties for disobeying a pretrial order is
legitimate pursuant to Rule 16.
Prior to the 1983 amendments, Rule 16 was silent about the impo-

sition of sanctions for violations of pretrial orders.137 The power to enforce pretrial orders was universally accepted absent specific language
in Rule 16.138 Judges derived the authority to impose sanctions either
from their inherent power, or from Rule 37(b).1 3 9
However, when formulating the Rule 16 amendments, the Advi-

sory Committee specifically granted sanctioning power to enforce Rule
16 orders in four situations.14 0 This amendment enables the judge to

enforce his orders,1 4 yet the power to sanction for violation of a pretrial order is discretionary. 4 There are two primary types of sanctions

used by judges to enforce pretrial orders under Rule 16. The first is the.

135. Resnik, supra note 109, at 425.
136. See Dvorak v. Shibata, 123 F.R.D. 608, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1988) (The court ordered
that each party must have a representative in attendance who was authorized to negotiate and
reach settlement without making any telephone calls. Its reasons for requiring such parties to
attend were: 1) that the clients learn of opposing arguments which may result in the softening of
their position; 2) the relaying of client's weakened position presented by the opposition's arguments may lose impact over the phone and enable the client to easily reject settlement; and, 3) the
absence of a decision maker may become a weapon by which the parties present take advantage of
less wealthy opponents.); see also In re Air Crash at Stapleton Int'l Airport, No. 751, slip op. at
18 (D. Colo. Oct. 14, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Courts file) (The court stated that ordering
representatives other than counsel to appear at conferences is within the court's power provided
such appearance will not prejudice the parties' presentation at trial.); Abney v. Patten, 686 F.
Supp. 567 (W.D. Okla. 1987). The plaintiff's counsel had informed the court the settlement was
off. The FDIC refused -to be compelled to send a person with full settlement authority to attend
future negotiations. Id. at 569.
137. Peckham, Federal Judges as Case Manager: The New Role Guiding a Case From
Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 774 (1981); see also Schiller & Wall, Judicial
Involvement in Pretrial Settlement: A Judge is not a Bump on a Log, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 27
(1982) (a study concerning the use of settlement as a means of reducing clogged dockets prior to
the amendments to Rule 16). Rule 16 states that coercive tactics used at the trial level are usually
rejected by appellate courts and that no sanctions should be imposed because there has been
disagreement between the parties and the judge concerning the possibility of settlement. Id. at 3233.
138. Peckham, supra note 137, at 774.
139. Id.; see also In re Baker, 744 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1984). The court held that although
the sanctions in question-a $300 fine imposed upon the attorneys for the plaintiff and the third
party defendant for delay of jury trial-were imposed before the amendments to Rule 16, the
authority to sanction has always been within the inherent authority of the courts. Id. at 1441.
140. These four situations are: 1) when the party or his attorney fails to obey a pretrial
order; 2) if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a pretrial conference; 3) if the party or
his attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in a pretrial conference; and, 4) if the party
or his attorney fail to participate in good faith Rule 16(f) allows the judge to impose sanctions.
FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
141. Peckham, supra note 137, at 789.
142. Id. at 790.
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more drastic. It is the dismissal of the plaintiff's action for failure to
prosecute, or, if the defendant is the violator, dismissal for default."4 a
This is often used when the case has remained on the docket for an
unreasonably long period of time. 14 The second type of sanction used
is less -prejudicial to the litigants. It is the imposition of fines or the
14 5
taxation of costs incurred by the complying parties.
Monetary sanctions were imposed upon Oat in the principle case.
The amount, $5860.01, represented the court costs and attorneys fees
of the other parties attending. Oat contended that the magistrate's order did not mandate the presence of a particular person at the conference so that the presence of its attorney and another attorney acting on
behalf of Oat's principals complied with the order. 46 The pertinent
part of the order states: "[iun addition to counsel, each party

. . .

shall

be represented at the conference in person by a representative having
full authority to settle the case or to make decisions and grant authority to counsel with respect to all matters that may be reasonably anticipated to come before the conference . . . ,11"
The court also noted,
with the exception of Oat, all parties complied with the letter of the
order by sending attorneys and corporate representatives.1 4 8 As a re-

sult, the court held that the language of the order was not am.143. Id.
144. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); see generally Annotation, Imposition of
Sanctions Under Rule 1609 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.for Failingto Obey Scheduling or
Pretrial Order, 90 A.L.R. FED. 157, 163 (.1988).
145. Peckham, supra note 137, at 790; see generally 90 A.L.R. FED. at 162. Costs include
not only the opposing party's costs, but court costs as well. Id.
146. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 655.
147. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 107 F.R.D. 275, 279 (W.D Wis.
1985), rev'd, 848 F.2d 1415 (7th Cir. 1988), aff'd en banc, 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989). The
entire December 18, 1984 order stated:
The progress of the conference was impaired by the fact that neither plaintiff Joseph
Oat Corporation, or its carrier National Union, was represented, in addition-to counsel, by
a,representative having full authority to settle the case ....
It appearing that a substantial possibility exists that a number of the claims and issues
in these cases may be susceptible of settlement, and that other related matters might be
considered (including the avoidance of unnecessary proof, cumulative evidence, and redundant litigation; the possibility of adopting amendments to the pleadings, the restructuring
of the parties; and the adoption of special procedures for managing this complex and protracted litigation) so as to secure the just and speedy determination of this litigation as the
least expense to the parties,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
2. In addition to counsel, each party and the insurance carriers of plaintiff Oat and
defendant RME, shall be represented at the conference in person by a representative having full authority to settle the case or to make decisions and grant authority to counsel
with respect to all matters that may be reasonably anticipated to come before the conference . ...
Id. (quoting Order of Dec. 18, 1984) (emphasis added).
148.byId.
at 278.
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biguous."'4
The majority in Heileman supports the interpretation that the imposition of sanctions is discretionary and states, "[a]bsent an abuse of
discretion, we may not disturb a district court's imposition of sanctions
for failure of a party to comply with a pretrial order. ' 150 According to
the language of the Heileman court's pretrial order, the request for the
presence of a corporate representative with authority to settle was unambiguous. The court imposed monetary sanctions in this case because
it determined that Oat was aware that such a person was required to
attend the conference. 15 ' The magistrate stated that the purpose of the
order was to "insure the presence of the parties personally at the conference.11 52 Without a reasonable explanation for the absence of a corporate representative, the violation was deemed willful. As proof of the
willful violation, the court considered the fact that Oat's counsel contacted the magistrate's office prior to the conference date regarding the
requirements of the order.' 53 This contact between Oat's counsel and
the magistrate's office, coupled with the fact that each party except
Oat had sent the required persons to the conference, supported the
court's conclusion that the failure to comply was willful. Therefore, the
court invoked its discretionary authority to impose sanctions upon Oat.
Although there was clearly a violation of the pretrial order, the
order itself was an abuse of the court's discretion. Mandating that certain persons be in attendance at the conference clearly violates Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 16(a)(5). This violation appears to nullify the
order. Thus, the imposition of the fine was abusive as well.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held,
in Heileman, that the district court had the authority to sanction a
represented party for failure to attend a pretrial conference. This broad
interpretation of Rule 16 expands the plain language of Rule 16(a)(5)
beyond what is clearly intended. The purpose of the Rule is to provide
a neutral forum for the litigants to explore the possibility of settlement,
not to coerce parties into accepting settlement proposals.

149. 871 F.2d at 655. ("While the November order may have been somewhat ambiguous,
any ambiguity was eliminated by the magistrate's 'emarks from the bench on December 14, the
written order of December 18, and the direction obtained by counsel from the magistrate's
clerk.").
150. Id.
151. 107 F.R.D. at 282.
152. 871 F.2d at 656.
153. Id. Prior to the December 19 conference, Joseph Oat's counsel contacted the magistrate's office to determine if the magistrate intended for the corporate representatives to be in
Madison, Wisconsin for the settlement conference. Counsel was assured such was the case. Id.
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Pursuant to the plain language of Rule 16, the presence of the
parties' attorneys is sufficient for the discussion of the possibility of settling the case. The attorney is aware of a client's settlement range, thus
making the presence of the client unnecessary. Also according to the
language of the Rule, a pro se litigant is required to attend the pretrial
conference under Rule 16. The continuous distinction between attorneys for the parties and unrepresented parties throughout the Rule
demonstrates that it was not the drafters' intention to require a client
to accompany his attorney to the conference.
However, through the use of the court's inherent power, the federal magistrate invoked his authority to compel the presence of a corporate representative at the pretrial conference. The court interprets its
inherent power as an extension of Rule 16. Such interpretation should
be carefully applied because it is clearly not authorized by the express
language of Rule 16. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals is not the
correct forum for extending or amending Rule 16 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Any revisions or amendments should be made
through the rigorous administrative process established for suchpurposes.
Katherine M. Kemp
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